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Abstract. It is shown that the popular RSA public key encryption scheme does not require 
two primes but that probable primes may be used instead. A method for finding probable 
primes is given and the security of systems based on probable primes is discussed. 
As is well known, number theory has recently been used to derive schemes for enciphering 
and deciphering secret messages. One popular scheme, the RSA public key encryption 
method is based on choosing two large prime numbers, p and q [z]. It is claimed that 
primes are needed in order to ensure that the enciphering and deciphering algorithms 
work correctly and to ensure the security of the system. In this note we show that 
primes are not necessary for the enciphering and deciphering algorithms to work; it is 
only necessary to find to numbers p and q which obey Fermat’s congruence. 
ap = a(mod p) (1) 
for all positive integers a. Numbers p for which (1) is true but which are not known to 
be prime are called probable primes. We also exhibit a simple test for finding probable 
primes p and q, and we discuss the security implications of using probable primes to 
encode and decode messages. 
Generatinhg an RSA public key encryption scheme according to the original method 
innvolves choosing two primes, p and q; computing their product, choosing a number d 
relatively prime to (p - 1) (q - l), and computing e so that that 
e E d-l (mod (p - l)(q - 1)). (2) 
With these definitions for p, q, d, and e, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman have shown that 
a ed = a (mod pq) (3) 
for any a [2]. Identity (3) can be made the basis of a method of encoding and decoding 
messages as follows. Represent the message as an integer m. Encode the message as 
the integer c E me (mod pq) . Then identity (3) h s ows that the original message can be 
recovered by computing cd (mod pq). 
Our first result shows that neither p nor q need be prime. 
THEOREM 1.. Let p and q be any two relatively prime positive integers which are either 
prime or composite probable primes. Suppose e and d are chosen as above. Then identify 
(3) is true for any integer a, even if a is not relatively prime to p or q. In order to prove 
this theorem, we need the following lemma. 
Lemma. Suppose n is a number for which un E a (mod n) for any positive integer a. 
Then for any positive integer k 
u(‘+‘)~+’ E a (mod n). 
Proof. Consider the chain of identities 
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&-W+l _ a ,a(a(n-l)k - 1) 
= a(an--l _ q(&-1)k-l) + . . . + a + 1) 
= (=n _ a)(,(‘4k-l) + . . . + a + 1). 
Since (an - u) is divisible by n, so is a(n-l)k+l - a. 
The proof of the main theorem follows. 
Proof of Theorem 1. By the definition of e, ed G 1 mod(p - l)(q - 1). Hence there is 
a positive integer a such that ed = s(p - l)(q - 1) + 1. Apply the lemma with n = p and 
k = s(q- 1). Then aed E a (mod p) which implies that aed -a is divisible by p. Similarly 
aed _ a is divisible by q. Since p and q are relatively prime, aed - a is divisible by pq and 
hence identify (3) is true. 
Now we discuss an algorithm for finding integers p and q that will work. As one would 
expect, it involves testing numbers to see if they satisfy identify (1). The algorithm is 
based on the following theorem. 
THEOREM 2.. Let n be any positive integer and consider the set G of positive integers 
less than n and relatively prime to n. If there is even one positive integer a in this set 
for which it is not true that 
an E a (mod n), 
i.e. (1) fails to hold for this a, then (1) fail3 to hold for at least half the members of this 
set. 
Proof. Note that the set G is a group under multiplication mod n and note that for 
integers relatively prime to n, (1) is equivalent to the identity a”-’ E 1 (mod n). Let A 
be the subset of G consisting of those elements of G for which identity (1) does hold. We 
show that A is a subgroup of G. The set A is non-empty since at least the integer 1 belongs 
to A. Now suppose two integers a and b belong to A. Then since a”-’ E 1 (mod n) and 
similarly for b, we must have (ab)“-’ E 1 ( mod n), that is A is closed under myltiplication 
mod n. Since G is a finite group, this implies that A is a subgroup. By hypothesis A 
is a proper subgroup of G. Thus the number of elements in A is no more than half the 
number of elements in G, or in other words at least half the elements in G are not in A 
and consequently fail to satisfy (1). 
The algorithm for finding an n for which (1) holds follows. 
Choose an odd positive integer n at random. Apply the test for suitability, given below, 
to n. If m is suitable, then stop, otherwise add 2 to n and test n+ 2. Keep adding 2 and 
testing until a suitable n is found. 
Test for suitability. Repeat the following steps 200 times or until n is rejected, whichever 
happens first. 
1. Generate an integer a at random in the range 1 < a < n. 
2. Find the greatest common divisor d of a and n. If d > 1 then reject n. 
3. Compute an-l (mod n). If the result is not 1 then reject n. 
The following comments apply to the above algorithm. 
1. Any prime positive integer will pass the suitability test and be selected. Hence the alo- 
girthm will eventually terminate. Indeed, the density of primes is such that it will termi- 
nate quickly [l]. 
2. The probability that an integer which is not a probable prime will pass the test is less than 
(1/2)2oo by theorem 2. (If greater security is desired, increase the number of trials). 
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3. It is possible for the algorithm to reject a composite probable prime at step d of the 
suitability test. However, this is unlikely n has a large number of factors. 
4. The algorithm is faster and easier to implement (and understand) than one based on a 
test for primality. 
In closing we comment on the security of public key cryptosystems which may use prob- 
able primes as well as primes. It is well known that in the case of systems based on 
prime numbers, the system can be broken by a would be spy if the spy can factor the 
product pq and determine p and q. In a public key encryption system the value of e 
is public knowledge. A knowledge of p and q thus enables a spy to compute d since 
d=ee-l mod (p-l)(q-1). H owever, if either p or q is a composite probable prime, 
factoring the product pq may not tell the spy what p and q are. The spy must discover 
the correct factorization! If indeed pq is somewhat easier to factor if one or both of p or 
q is not prime, the combinatorial problem of discovering the correct factorization at least 
partially compensates for the greater ease of factoring pq. In addition, it is very dificult 
to determine from the product pq if either p or q is not prime without knowing either p or 
q. Hence a would be spy is not going to know if he has a product pq which is the product 
of two primes or not until he has successfully factored the product. It is in fact highly 
likely that the above algorithm will produce two prime numbers since primes occur much 
more frequently than probable primes [l]. Thus it is not wise for a spy to assume he is 
dealing with a code in which a probable prime has been used even if he knows that the 
above algorithm has been used. In other words it is highly likely that the above algorithm 
will produce a code which is just as secure as one produced by methods which ensure the 
production of primes. We believe that the saving in cost produced by using our algorithm 
will j’ustify its use in many situations. 
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